Can Nepalis Coexist With Nepal?

A snarky question, even bordering on the seditious? Perhaps. But it’s one that cannot be evaded.
When Ram Kumari Jhankri, a ruling party lawmaker in the dissolved parliament, said Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli was emulating King Mahendra, much of the country probably wished she was complimenting him.
However, Jhankri, speaking at a public function in Bardghat as a constituent of the Pushpa Kamal Dahal-Madhav Kumar Nepal faction of the Nepal Communist Party, served to exemplify our collective ambivalence.
The penchant to see King Mahendra as Nepal’s most egregious villain does much more than ignore his matchless contributions to strengthening Nepali nationhood. It encapsulates our inability to identify ourselves as well as our place in the world.
In a perfect world, the elected government of Prime Minister B.P. Koirala might have continued in office with the foreign policy King Mahendra subsequently pursued. Despite their deep differences over domestic politics, both leaders shared broadly identical visions regarding Nepal and the world.
We can argue ad infinitum over whether B.P.’s government – and the polity in general – could have survived the time’s geopolitical pressures or whether the Panchayat system was the sole inevitable outcome. But that is what happened.
Our view of how reality should have unfolded need not define how we view ourselves as Nepalis. Even amid its isolation, Nepal marched to the drum of the times. Our baise-chaubise states were locked in a struggle to come out of feudal societies based on tradition to the modern state system approximating the raison d’état of Cardinal Richelieu. Except, it’s safe to assume, our petty potentates had no clue about the Thirty Years’ War.
Prithvi Narayan Shah and his immediate successors waged a campaign to establish a nation-state defined by common language and culture, much in the way the wars of the French Revolution had. But the Treaty of Westphalia or the Congress of Vienna were not common terms in the bhardari sabha.
The Rana rulers might have been familiar with some of the triggers that eventually disintegrated the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, but they felt the geopolitical ripples from the north and the south far more uncomfortably. And in an irony of ironies, Nepal, never a colony, had to face more than half a decade of Soviet vetoes in its quest for United Nations membership. India, still under the British Raj in 1945, is ranked as a founding member of the world organization.
Continuing to debate how much Nepal is a nation and how much a state may reflect the vibrancy and candor of our democratic discourse. How productive would that be today, when cities, cyberspace and common citizens continue to challenge the nation-state as the principal unit of world order? The post-Cold War world’s contours still remained largely obscure when the international system moved on to the equally abstruse ‘post-post-Cold War’ era.
In that sense, the demand to restore the monarchy to save the country becomes no more backward-looking than the communist/socialist vision still largely drawn from a German’s musings at a British library a century and a half ago.
Today, we are a nation entrapped between one open and pluralistic civilizational state that sees our independence as a threat to its national security; another regimented civilizational state that is committed to a fully and functionally independent Nepal; and a diminished but determined superpower intent on seeing an independent but pliable Nepal between the two rising Asian behemoths.
Our inability to accept who we have been has only been deepening fissures over who we want to be. Nepalis need to reconcile with Nepal.

Tightening Tibet Tangle

Long before outgoing US President Donald J. Trump signed into law the Tibetan Policy and Support Act (TPSA) 2020 in late December, Nepal knew it had to brace itself for the impending Dalai Lama succession fallout. The problem is that we don’t seem to know how.
The political system – as practiced – cannot confront the challenge. The Nepali psyche seems far more confounded. Politically, an independent, sovereign and democratic Tibet would appeal to Nepal. Geopolitically, it would mean we would lose our border with China, intensifying our innate sense of vulnerability. Democracy or the nation? That distasteful choice is looming larger.
With the Indians itching for a fight with China on the back of a gung-ho United States, the battle lines are clear enough. On the opposing side is a China buoyed by its success in overcoming the coronavirus pandemic at the end of the Hundred Year Marathon. Sure, many still speak of Beijing’s entrenched vulnerabilities. But, then, these are some same people who think an Indo-American alliance against China may have come too late.
However else he may try to distinguish himself from his predecessor, President-elect Joseph Biden can’t afford to go soft on China. No style change can unstiffen the substance of – to put it crudely – a life-and-death struggle over who will control the world. Trigger-happy constituents in the Washington policy establishment who passed for neoconservatives under Republicans are now with centrist Democrats.
In New Delhi, ‘hyperrealists’ need to contend with traditional realists before moving ahead to liberate Tibet and extend India’s strategic space. The wily Chinese have been trying to woo and warn average Indians well before they firmly hitch onto the American bandwagon.
Nepal needs to make allowances for anything between maintenance of the status quo and the emergence of a free Tibet, without losing its focus on the Dalai Lama’s succession struggle. Ordinarily, a process stretching over years, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, in his inimitably amiable style, has sought changes. His successor need not be a male and could be born outside traditional Tibetan territory.
His Holiness seems to have left so much wiggle room that the TPSA only categorically states that interference of the People’s Republic of China in decisions regarding the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation would amount to a violation of the fundamental religious freedoms of Tibetan Buddhists and the Tibetan people.
That stand contrasts with China’s contention that reincarnation is not a personal decision of the Dalai Lama. From Beijing’s standpoint, the process follows certain religious traditions and rituals and must be approved by the Chinese central government in a tradition dating back to the patron-priest system of the Qing Dynasty.
Significantly, Beijing considers issues related to Tibet intrinsic to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It believes it has weaned away enough traditional American allies on Tibet. China also seems to count on traditional divisions among Tibetan sects, which have only subsided amid the Fourteenth Dalai Lama’s charisma. After all, they’ve dealt with parallel Dalai Lamas in the past. Heck, Beijing discovered one had been dead for years as advisers were counseling that he had gone into deep meditation. The Chinese believe tradition as a tool can be buttressed by Tibet’s modernization.
While Nepalis can’t fathom how the succession process might unfold, we do recognize that it will not be controversy-free. For all his ingenuity, Tenzin Gyatso probably won’t be fast-tracking the selection of his successor. A drawn-out contest can convulse Nepal for years on top of the broader geopolitical dynamics.
The bad news is that the Chinese don’t seem so happy about Nepal on this matter. True, they invaded us in retaliation for our invasion of Tibet in 1792 and turned us into a tributary. They may not have fulfilled their Betravati Treaty commitments, but they did tolerate the anomaly of the Dalai Lama paying tribute to Nepal even as Kathmandu sent quinquennial missions to Beijing. Communist China granted us the privilege of maintaining Lhasa’s only foreign consulate.
Beijing has run out of patience for excuses such as weak Nepali state capacity. In Chinese eyes, a country that could play a constructive if not entirely satisfactory role in the aftermath of the 1904 Younghusband Expedition and the 1913 return of the Thirteen Dalai Lama from exile could certainly do more to ward off anti-China tendencies today if it really wanted to.
The last high-level Chinese delegation was packed with ‘wolf warriors’ who refused Nepali security. Almost overnight, our discourse has shifted from Sikkimization-Bhutanization-Fijization to outright Koreanization. Now, that’s called a fast track.

How Do We Get Back To Where We Belong?

Just as the ‘how’ of the monarchy-restoration campaign was hobbling the organizers, Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) chairman Kamal Thapa stepped in to help.
Addressing a protest rally in Kathmandu last week, Thapa raised the possibility of restoring the monarchy from the streets. Stressing that the restoration of Hindu nation and the monarchy was no longer solely the RPP agenda, he warned the political parties that the situation could get out of control if they failed to act responsibly on time.
The RPP has been demanding the restoration of monarchy and Hindu state through an all-party conference. Although it won over a dozen seats in the second constituent assembly elections held in 2013, the party was soon perceived as having relegated the monarchy behind Hindu statehood in terms of priority. The party’s eagerness to join successive governments under a republican, secular and federal constitution further eroded public confidence.
Thapa personally came in for much opprobrium from peers and the people at large. When the notoriously schismatic RPP factions united in 2017 taking its contingent in the house to 37, it could barely survive a year. Thapa confidantes blamed Nirmal Niwas for engineering the split, heightening speculation of the monarch’s dissatisfaction with the Thapa’s campaign to restore the monarchy.
By the time the streets began erupting in leaderless protests demanding the return of the monarchy late last year, the disparate organizers were united in denying Thapa and his party any place.
That precipitated much-needed candor from Thapa in a television interview a couple of weeks ago. Confirming that elements close to Nirmal Niwas had conspired against his party in the past, Thapa also had some advice for its principal occupant. The ex-king should exhibit more high-mindedness in reaching out to the political leaders to build an atmosphere conducive to the return of the monarchy in the national interest.
Throughout the interview, Thapa’s dignified language did not conceal his exasperation over what he perceived to be an organized marginalization campaign. As home minister under King Gyanendra’s direct rule, Thapa was responsible for unleashing the state's coercive force against the burgeoning protests, resulting in some two dozen deaths.
Thapa could easily have taken the easy route of some of his ministerial colleagues and blamed the king for not listening to him. Instead, he turned his Rastriya Prajatantra Party Nepal into the only pro-monarchy organization. With the death of the flamboyant Rabindra Nath Sharma, Thapa became the public face of a campaign considered nothing short of sacrilegious at the time.
During his recent interview, Thapa defended his decision to join K.P. Oli government but said it had been a mistake to join the Pushpa Kamal Dahal administration. Given the public support the Oli government continues to enjoy for its steadfast response to the Indian blockade and initiatives to expand ties with China, Thapa might seem cynical to make that distinction. Still, you have to admit that Thapa rose to the occasion given the prevailing circumstances.
The RPP’s decision to join the Dahal government was not necessarily a mistake. By the same logic of Thapa’s critics, it can be said that the RPP exposed the Maoists’ eagerness to join hands with royalists in a bid to gain power. Still, if the boss admits it was a mistake, the point becomes moot.
What’s not moot is Thapa’s larger but unspoken point. Sure, he made mistakes here and there, which have been illuminated in hindsight. But can you deny that the RPP kept the agenda against republicanism, secularism and federalism alive long enough for the rest of the country to catch on?
Pettiness is perhaps not Thapa’s style – at least not in public. So he eases the pressure on the disparate monarchists flustered by their inability to agree on a road to restoration. King Gyanendra has made it clear that he doesn’t consider it his responsibility to provide a roadmap.
So a referendum, restoration of the 1990 Constitution and amendments to the current one are among alternatives that have muddied the waters. Thapa, a supporter of the third option, has now suggested a fourth as the streets. Intended to bolster his original position, this new one is treacherously ambiguous enough in its application to turn a lot more heads.

An Interview That Never Happened (But Should Have)

Time: Undisclosed

Place: Undisclosed

Maila Baje: We’re in deep trouble and here you are, vice-minister How’s your parachute diplomacy going?

 

Guo Yezhou: It’s easy to make fun of it, isn’t it? But aren’t you undercutting the seriousness of it all?

 

MB: This is out of seriousness. Nepalis used to blame Indians for this kind of interventionism. At least we know the Indians better.

 

GY: As if Indians were intervening out of familiarity?

 

MB: Point taken. But why this assertiveness now? Has Nepal catapulted to the top of Chinese foreign policy priorities without us knowing?

 

GY: You are half-right there. Nepal has become a top priority for China, and I emphasize the word ‘for’ here. When you’re not able to discharge a normal state’s normal functions, it worries us – for our own sake.

 

MB: That sounds like a wholesale abandonment of your vaunted policy of non-interference.

 

GY: Your inability to maintain your international commitments affects us. Do you expect us not to interfere?

 

MB: Why this interest in the internal affairs of the ruling Nepal Communist Party?

 

GY: Nepali and Indian media have made much of how we facilitated the unity between the Maoists and Marxist Leninists. We have never confirmed our role. But we haven’t denied it either.

 

MB: Okay, did you play a role?

 

GY: Yes, and it wasn’t easy, as you might have guessed. We persuaded both sides of unification’s wisdom and its broader salutary effects on Nepal and the region. And we thought we had convinced them?

 

MB: You hadn’t?

 

GY: You tell me. All of our commitments to securing Nepal’s long-term viability and value as an independent, sovereign and territorially indivisible state were predicated on Nepal’s firm commitment to upholding China’s interests. In other words, it was a mutual undertaking.

 

MB: You’re saying Nepal hasn’t been sincere?

 

GY: I am. You signed all these important agreements with us to use them to seek a better deal from India and the United States. Those papers are gathering dust, but you’re busy making excuses.

 

MB: What excuses?

 

GY: That rival external powers are pressuring you against building closer relations with China.

 

MB: But China isn’t the only foreign power we have to worry about. And while we’re nitpicking, Beijing hasn’t exactly been faithful to its commitments to Kathmandu. Bahadur Shah, Bhimsen Thapa, Birendra, Gyanendra and Dahal are just a few examples.

 

GY: You’re not expecting to keep getting away with this? We didn’t help you against the British in 1814-1816 under the 1792 Betravati Treaty provisions because you manufactured that crisis expressly to draw us in for purely Nepali factional politics.

 

MB: I can’t believe you just said that. We lost a third of our territory.

 

GY: Not because of us. Don’t expect us to take the fall for Gajaraj Mishra, Chandrasekhar Upadhyaya, and your internal machinations and mishandling.

 

MB: What about more modern times?

 

GY: You couldn’t explain to India why you purchased arms from us in 1988-89. Instead, you tried to drag us into the aftermath with least sensitivity to events in Eastern Europe and Tiananmen Square, etc. In 2005-2006, you assured us things would be in control. For all his ‘people’s war’ bluster, Dahal overplayed his hand far worse at a time when our rivals were trying to use the Beijing Olympics and its aftermath to undermine China. Let’s take something more recent, like President Xi’s visit. He flew in directly from that informal summit with Modi, and you reneged on the extradition treaty.

 

MB: But you do appreciate all the pressure we were under. And President Xi did put us in a tight spot with his original ‘wolf warrior’ crushed-skulls-and-bones bit.

 

GY: At least we were sensitive enough to give that story a Beijing dateline and obfuscate the real target.

 

MB: It sure seems like somebody’s fuming.

 

GY: Wouldn’t you be? Yet your show goes on. You couldn’t even stick to your new map after fully and formally incorporating it in the Constitution. Your decision not to distribute the new schoolbooks containing the new map may not have been enough to appease India. It was more than enough to infuriate us. Just imagine how bad it would have been for us if we had openly backed you on the territorial dispute with India? And what did we get for not even defending that bilateral agreement with India on Lipulekh? Your Nepali Congress accuses us of territorial encroachment in Humla.

 

MB: So all this justifies your meddling now?

 

GY: It sure does. You shouldn’t have given us those false promises. Sure, there is not much you can do amid the external pressures. But you’re not even doing the bare minimum you should be, such as keeping your NCP intact.

 

MB: Thank you for your time. A lot to think about.

 

GY: Remember, not just think about – but do.

Sharpness For Crown And Country’s Sake

If Nirmal Niwas seems a bit apathetic over the nationwide spontaneous protests in favor of reinstating the monarchy, you can’t really blame its chief occupant.
Consider the content and color of the discourse. Gyanendra Shah can’t be characterized as ex-king in the absence of an incumbent, we hear. Once a king, always one, just to be sure. Others – and more and more of them – insist that Nepal needs some form of monarchy because of its singular domestic and geopolitical circumstances.
How is the institution to be reinstated? By bringing back the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990, which most of the parties once hailed as the world’s best. And how’s that to be done? A Supreme Court order on what would be considered until fairly recently a frivolous lawsuit. A military coup in which the generals beseech their supreme commander to begin wearing the uniform again?
Or a United Nations Security Council Resolution steered by permanent member China and incoming temporary member India to revive a new multilateralism as the old drivers are preoccupied within?
Then, there’s the next biggie. What kind of monarchy? If the crown is to be brought back to address our special national circumstances, can we really qualify it in traditional terms? Ceremonial, constructive, constitutional, call it what you may – but we surely aren’t looking at the milk-and-rice-fed variant. The nation’s guardian must be allowed to guard it, one would think.
As for the ‘who’, the debate is misdirected. The people can bring back the monarchy, but can they expect to choose the person? He hasn’t spoken about it, but King Gyanendra pretty much knows the difference between an elected republic and a hereditary monarchy. If there’s anyone who can decide who sits on the throne, it’s King Gyanendra.
Yet advocates are splitting hairs over raja (monarch), rajtantra (monarchism) and rajsantha (monarchy). Sure the king’s person, the institution and the crown/throne can be considered separate entities. To what end?
When you have one individual embodying the institution in its full regalia, how would you expect things to work by debating the finer points on republican premises? Granted, no one wants to be perceived as supporting the monarchy we’ve had. But, then, that means you’re accepting the premise of the monarchy’s critics all the way.
You can argue over the good and bad parts of our royal history. Specifically, King Gyanendra could have done things better, such as retaining head of government’s position. (Do we really know the full story even to say that?) But why should the parties that produced the putridity and pushed the palace to invoke Article 127 get a pass from the monarch’s failure?
King Gyanendra appears more prone to such pondering. The crown was thrust upon the toddler the first time amid great uncertainty for Nepal. The Ranas enthroned him to save their oligarchy. They may have failed, but the king did save the country. Yet in our official royal history, his brief reign is not even a footnote. (No wonder everyone got the math around Baba Gorakhnath’s legendary boon so wrong.)
King Gyanendra’s second ascension came amid great institutional and personal calamity, not to speak of the danger the nation faced. Yet he had to confront sustained calumny along with those serious challenges. He didn’t plan a coronation, but was still blamed for all that went wrong during the Ranas’ century-long and Bhimsen Thapa’s three-decade autocracy.
A third reign would have to clean the second mess the political parties have created in a generation. How can he be sure his campaign doesn’t confront the same political chicanery?
Having dissociated himself from the ongoing protests, King Gyanendra is probably enjoying the spectacle. And not altogether as a belated vindication. This was a debate Nepal needed circa 2005-2006. It’s not too late to sharpen the deliberations for the sake of the crown and the country.