The Oli government is under fire over whether or when it knew India was constructing a link road to Manasarovar in Tibet via Nepali territory and what it intends to do about it now. The national narrative took a sharp turn as the rest of us were still trying to figure out the extent and implications of Chinese involvement in patching up the latest rift in the ruling party.
Things weren’t getting any easier for us. Chinese nationals complaining of having been left stranded here were caught in a scuffle with Nepali police. The Chinese Embassy, almost going along with the Nepali version of events that the protestors attacked first, urged Chinese nationals to follow Nepali laws.
Around this time came a tweet by state-run China Global Television Network suggesting Mount Everest to be on its side of the border, prompting much outrage among Nepali cyber dwellers. The TV station eventually made a correction. From those two reactions, Beijing almost seemed impatient to draw a sharp contrast with New Delhi, which continues to insist the Manasarovar road fell completely within Indian territory.
Not a minute too soon, Nepal’s principal trilateralist swung into action. Since China is also involved in the Indian government’s construction of the link road, talking with New Delhi alone will not be sufficient, Dahal said at a meeting of the State Affairs and Good Governance Committee in Parliament. The former prime minister’s reference was to a 2015 agreement between China and India to open a bilateral trade route via Lipulekh.
Dahal conceded that the Oli government had failed to take concrete initiatives to resolve the issue despite an all-party consensus after India’s publication of new political map last November. Having just issued a joint statement with Oli on the subject, Dahal has ostensibly chosen to focus more on a resolution than recriminations.
Taking the issue to the international court right away was not a good idea, Dahal said, stating that the issue was a complex one. That is a sentiment shared by others – including leading experts – who insist that Nepal should be prepared for the time, resources, energy and patience such an undertaking would entail.
With bilateralism having a decades-long record of failure here, trilateralism has an obvious appeal. Yet, what makes Dahal – and the rest of us – think that it would make things easier or more effective? The Indians have heard our grievances loud and clear. It’s just that they don’t like them. Now we’ll have to explain everything to the Chinese all over again. After all, it’s not like Nepali media reports and public opinion surveys have had much resonance in the average hearing range up north.
The Indians are not likely to shed their penchant for bilateralism, especially since that mechanism is still in existence. We may be ready to debate why the process has stalled, but would the Chinese be interested? All they did was sign a bilateral trade arrangement with New Delhi concerning territory they believed to be under full and complete Indian sovereignty.
Buyer beware? Sure. But what if we never formally notified the Chinese of the disputed nature of that part of the bill of goods? And, worse, what if the Indians and Chinese start arguing bilaterally?
Might there be a chance of a geopolitical resolution as part of a wider Sino-Indian border bargain? Even there, experience tells us that it would eternally remain in the realm of possibility. How many times have we heard Chinese pledges of assistance to sustain our sovereignty fade into silence when the moment of truth arrived?
So, yes, Comrade Dahal, the issue may be too complicated to take to the international court right away. But what’s to say trilateralization wouldn’t undermine our ability to exercise that option eventually?
