If you were expecting fireworks at the upcoming secretariat meeting of the ruling Nepal Communist Party, Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe has dashed your hopes.
The NCP has decided to make the November 30 meeting ‘non-controversial’, citing the Chinese dignitary’s visit scheduled for the previous day.
The secretariat is slated to receive a written proposal from Prime Minister and NCP chair Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli the day before Wei’s arrival and hold discussions on it the day after his departure. The timing of the visit is probably forcing us to search for connections that may not exist. But, then, who really knows what’s going on here?
Oli’s proposal comes in response to the document submitted by co-chair Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ last week. Although forwarded as a political proposal, Dahal’s text is so laced with accusations of corruption, nepotism and dictatorship by Oli that it reads more like a manifesto for his removal from the premiership.
An explicably irate Oli demanded that Dahal withdraw the proposal, which the latter rebuffed with the support of other key members of the secretariat. Oli is expected to lay bare his own set of serious allegations and accusations against Dahal.
The NCP secretariat, however, says it would withhold details of Oli’s proposal to avoid marring Wei’s visit, already the subject of much speculation.
Although officials are tight-lipped over the visit, Wei would be the high-ranking Chinese official to visit Nepal since President Xi Jinping in October last year. Wei is believed to be visiting in connection with the 65th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Nepal and China. During his daylong stay in the capital on November 29, he will meet with President Bidhya Bhandari, Prime Minister Oli and Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali, among others.
Amid growing public protests against China’s interference in Nepal and official Chinese media taking aim at the Nepali Congress for fanning anti-Beijing sentiments, the NCP is understandably loath to rock the boat any further. Especially not when Chinese Ambassador Hou Yanqi’s activism vis-à-vis the ruling party’s internal rifts continues unabated.
While we can expect Wei to reciprocate the NCP’s proclivity for civility, he will have pointed questions on Nepal’s approach to and intention towards the evolving regional dynamics.
The string of visits to Nepal by India’s spy and military chiefs and the imminent arrival of the foreign secretary coincides with India’s pronounced entry into the US-led Indo-Pacific alliance to contain China. Beijing, for its part, has initiated its own version of the Quad in South Asia.
Clearly, the Chinese have not abandoned their support for a trilateral framework with India on Nepal, Beijing appears to have felt the more pressing need to pursue comprehensive Nepal-China engagement. The creation of the NCP and its preponderance in power appeared to have instilled some confidence in Beijing, which had been searching long for a reliable post-monarchy partner in Nepal.
Yet China’s efforts to build institutional and ideological coherence into party-to-party relations have coincided with serious rifts within the NCP. Much of the rupture, from Kathmandu’s vantage point, may be attributable to personality clashes and competing ambitions of leaders. Beijing, however, increasingly views the NCP’s inner rivalries as part of the larger geopolitical churning process under way.
The early word was that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was to arrive in Kathmandu. Yet in a late evening meeting with Oli, Chinese ambassador Hou finalized Wei’s trip. Indeed, Wei must have found it easier to accommodate Nepal on his regional itinerary. But that couldn’t have been the only reason.
Foreign Minister Wang’s arrival in close succession may not contain the glitz of the two-plus-two confabulations between the American and Indian foreign and defense ministers. The urgency for Nepal and China may be no less, especially when a party so deep in civil war so fervently feels the need for civility.